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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RONNIE LEE GARDNER,
Petitioner-Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant,

:
:

Case No. 910500

:

Category No. 3

v.
TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden of the
Utah State Prison, STATE OF
UTAH,

:

Respondent-Appellant,
and Cross-Appellee.
:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a decision granting in part and
denying in part a petition for postconviction relief.

This Court

has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(i) (1992) because the appeal is from a district court
involving a capital felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
PRESENTED IN THE CROSS-APPEAL
When reviewing an appeal from a denial of a
postconviction petition, "we survey the record in the light most
favorable to the findings and judgment; and we will not reverse
if there is a reasonable basis therein to support the trial
court's refusal to be convinced that the writ should be granted."
Medina v. Cook, 779 P.2d 658, 658 (Utah 1989).

This standard of

review applies to all of the issues raised in petitioner's crossappeal, and, thus, all of the points of this brief.

1.

Point I is the reply brief in the State's appeal;

consequently the issue presented and standards of review were
previously given in the State's opening brief,
2.

Did the postconviction court correctly determine

that counsel had not been ineffective in the enumerated areas?
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are mixed questions of
fact and law.

State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990)

(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
3.

Did the postconviction court properly deny the

petition on the issue of the use of hypnotically refreshed
testimony?

This Court will not reverse denial of a petition "if

there is a reasonable basis [in the record] to support the
[postconviction] court's refusal to be convinced that the writ
should be granted."

Medina v. Cook, 779 P.2d 658, 658 (Utah

1989).
4.

Did the postconviction court properly determine

that the trial court was not required to advise petitioner that
he did not have to testify at trial?

The same standard from

Medina applies.
5.

Did the postconviction court correctly determine

that petitioner's right to be present at all critical stages of
the proceedings was substantially observed?

The same standard

applies.
6.

Did the postconviction court correctly determine

that the information about the victim disclosed to the jury did
not warrant granting the petition?
-2-

The same standard applies.
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Did the postconviction court correctly determine

that there was no basis at trial to instruct the jury on the
mitigating factor of duress?
8.

The same standard applies.

Did the postconviction court correctly determine

that the trial court's rejection of petitioner's requested
instruction that the jury had to find the existence of
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt was correct?
The same standard applies.
9.

Did the postconviction court correctly deny

petitioner's motion for appointment of investigators and expert
witnesses at State expense?

Whether there is a constitutional

right to investigators and expert witnesses at postconviction
proceedings is a legal conclusion.
reviewed for correctness.

Legal conclusions are

City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788

P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied. 111 S. Ct. 120 (1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies are included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The statement of the case was presented in the State's
opening brief and will not be repeated here.

The trial court

granted the petitioner's writ on two issues:

1) ineffective

assistance of counsel at trial regarding Dr. Heinbecker's
testimony; and 2) ineffective assistance on appeal.
cross-appeal addresses the additional issues of:

Petitioner's

1) ineffective

assistance of counsel because of a conflict of interest and other
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enumerated allegations of counsel errors; 2) use at trial of
hypnotically enhanced testimony; 3) the trial court's failure to
advise petitioner of a right to testify or to remain silent; 4)
petitioner's right to be present at pretrial proceedings; 5) the
jury's consideration of information about the victim; 6) the
trial court's failure to instruct on all statutory mitigating
circumstances; 7) the trial court's failure to instruct that the
prosecution had to establish the existence of an aggravating
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt; and 8) violation of
petitioner's constitutional rights by the postconviction court's
refusal to appoint an investigator and expert witnesses for
purposes of his postconviction claims.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On April 2, 1985, two officers from the Utah State
Prison, Luther Hensley and Stan McAfee, delivered petitioner to
the basement entrance of the Third District Court at about 8:55
a.m. (Transcript of criminal trial [hereafter Tr.] 1981-85, 1996,
2046, 2056, 1394).

As the trio approached the elevators inside

the foyer, petitioner turned and walked casually toward the
drinking fountain (Tr. 1983, 1998, 2048, 2058).

A woman standing

near the fountain handed petitioner a handgun which he pointed
toward the guards as he turned and moved toward them (Tr. 2001,
2002, 2059-60, 2106-10).
Petitioner fumbled with the gun as if it had been
handed to him awkwardly (Tr. 2060).

Petitioner's gun was a

single-action .22 caliber revolver (Tr. 2363, 2368-69).
-4-

Each

time the gun was fired, its hammer had to be cocked in a separate
action (Tr- 2363).

The gun will not fire without first being

cocked (Tr. 2363, 2365-66).

He advanced slowly on the guards who

drew their weapons as they retreated out of the building (Tr.
2002-03, 2061).

Hensley fired at petitioner from outside the

building, hitting petitioner in the shoulder/chest area (Tr.
2023, 2152).

Petitioner ducked into the door of the clerk's

office where there were three attorneys, a court clerk and a
uniformed prison employee (Tr. 2026, 2064, 2144-47, 2150-52).
Petitioner first backed into the doorway and glanced at two of
the attorneys who were trying to hide behind a door; then he
moved out to the elevators and tried to push the call button (Tr.
2152-53).

When he could not reach the button, petitioner

returned to the clerk's office (Tr. 2153-54).

Petitioner looked

at Robert Macri and Michael Burdell who were trying to hide
behind the door.

Petitioner pointed the gun at Macri, then, when

Burdell said, "Oh, my God," petitioner aimed the gun at Burdell,
said, "Oh, fu . . .," and fired (Tr. 2217, 2155-57, 2238).
Meanwhile, Cathy Gallegos, who had been waiting for the
elevator as petitioner and the guards walked into the building,
managed to get inside and ride to the fifth floor (Tr. 2104,
2112, 2116).

Before she entered the elevator, Gallegos heard two

shots but she did not know petitioner was wounded (Tr. 2110-11).
As the elevator doors closed, she saw petitioner crouched, ready
to fire (Tr. 2112).

On the fifth floor, Gallegos told bailiff
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Nick Kirk that she thought a guard had been shot (Tr. 2116-16,
2271, 2273).
Kirk, uniformed but unarmed, ran down the stairs to the
basement where he saw petitioner standing inside the clerk's
office (Tr. 2275).

Kirk looked around for his judge and turned

back to face petitioner (Tr. 2275-77).

Petitioner raised the

gun, aimed at Kirk, and shot him in the stomach (Tr. 2277).

Kirk

slumped to the floor (Tr. 2278).
Moving back inside the clerk's office, petitioner told
Richard Thomas, a prison employee, to come with him and show the
way out (Tr. 2251, 2278-79).

Thomas stepped over Burdell and

Kirk and led petitioner back out of the office doors to the
stairwell (Tr. 2163, 2252, 2254).
Petitioner climbed the stairs to the second floor where
he accosted Wilburn Miller near the exit (Tr. 2255, 2289, 2295).
Waving the gun, he told Miller to help him and said, "You are
next.

Walk with me." (Tr. 2297, 2308).

They went outside where

Miller broke away, ran back into the building, and dived through
a cashier window (Tr. 2297-99).

Petitioner proceeded to the

front lawn of the courthouse where he was apprehended (Tr. 231315).

Petitioner was bleeding from his shoulder and said he could

not breathe.

He had a blank facial expression, seemed calm and

gave no indication of pain (Tr. 2315-17, 2332).

He smiled a

couple of times (Tr. 2071, 2333).
The woman who passed the gun to petitioner also hid a
duffel bag filled with clothing, a hunting knife, a role of duct
-6-

tape and a ski mask in the women's restroom before petitioner
arrived (Tr. 2059-60, 2135-36, 2145, 2171-72).

Petitioner

admitted that he had planned an escape which closely matched the
events of April 2, 1985 (Tr. 2305-08, 2421, 2444).

He claimed,

however, that he was surprised by the woman with the gun and that
he was unfamiliar with the gun (Tr. 2411, 2413).

He complained

that he was a nervous wreck and did not recall most of what
happened (Tr. 2415-16, 2422, 2454), although he did recall
shooting Kirk, talking to Thomas and Miller and walking up the
stairs (Tr. 2426-29, 2422).

He also admitted that he walked

toward the drinking fountain to further his plan to escape and
that he thought that the woman, whom he would not identify, was
there to shield a weapon (Tr. 2441-42).
In the hospital, defendant told Wayne Jorgensen, a
prison guard, that he would have shot Hensley, but the gun would
not fire, even though he kept pulling the trigger (Tr. 2482).

He

said he shot Burdell because he thought Burdell looked as though
he would jump on him (Tr. 2486).

Petitioner declared that he

would have killed anyone who tried to stop him or get in his way
and that he hated prison (Tr. 2487-88).

Petitioner also said he

did not know he was shot until he was outside and people were
screaming at him to drop the gun (Tr. 2487).
Michael Burdell was dead on arrival at the hospital
(Tr. 2351).

Nick Kirk recovered from his injuries (Tr. 2280).

The jury convicted petitioner of first degree murder, attempted
first degree murder, aggravated kidnaping, escape, and possession
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of a dangerous weapon by an inmate.
penalty for first degree murder.

They imposed the death

This Court affirmed

petitioner's convictions and death sentence on January 31, 1989,
and denied rehearing on November 15, 1989. The United States
Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari on April
16, 1990.

See State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989), cert.

denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Petitioner's trial counsel did not provide ineffective
assistance.

Petitioner has not shown that they were laboring

under any actual conflict of interest; consequently, petitioner
was obligated to show prejudice to establish ineffective
assistance.

The postconviction court determined that there was

no prejudice in the areas petitioner raises as conflicts.
Regarding the other claims of ineffective assistance,
petitioner has shown no prejudice, even in the areas in which the
postconviction court determined that they may have been deficient
performance.

Specifically, petitioner has shown neither

deficient performance nor prejudice in the manner in which trial
counsel presented the defense that the shooting was
unintentional.

Secondly, the advice that petitioner testify at

trial was sound trial strategy and not ineffective assistance.
Thirdly, counsel was not ineffective for introducing petitioner's
prior criminal history on direct examination.

Case law at the

time of petitioner's trial had not precluded their introduction.
In any event, even if counsel's performance were deficient, the
-8-

evidence of petitioner's guilt was such that no prejudice was
established.

Next, at the time of trial, there was no

requirement to request a bifurcated guilt phase to avoid
introduction of previous convictions.

Consequently, it was not

ineffective assistance to fail to ask for bifurcation.
The use of hypnotically refreshed testimony was error
but harmless.

The tainted testimony was not critical and did not

vary significantly from the pre-hypnosis testimony; in addition,
it was merely cumulative to the testimony of another witness who
was not tainted.
Petitioner has not demonstrated that it was error for
the trial court to fail to advise petitioner that he did not have
to testify.
Petitioner has also not demonstrated that his right to
be present at all critical stages of the proceedings was
violated.

He was present at the hearings on his motions for

recusal and for change of venue.

He has presented no analysis or

argument to support his claim that he had the right to be present
when the trial court reviewed exhibits.
Information about the victim which was disclosed to the
jury was minimal and was not violative of the law in effect at
that time.

The postconviction correctly declined to apply

subsequent contrary case law retroactively.
Refusal to instruct the jury on the statutory
mitigating factor of duress was correct because the term must
consist of threatening third person conduct which produces a
-9-

reasonable fear of immediate harm.

This is consistent with the

context of the statutory language and precludes petitioner's
argument that his wound caused "stress" which constituted duress.
The law does not require an instruction that the jury
had to find the existence of aggravating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt; consequently, it was not grounds for
postconviction relief to refuse to so instruct the jury.
Any constitutional right to appointment of
investigators or expert witnesses at state expense applies only
to trial and first appeal of right.

The right does not extend to

discretionary postconviction proceedings.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
REPLY TO PETITIONER'S BRIEF OF APPELLEE ON
THE ISSUES OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IN THE
PENALTY PHASE AND ON APPEAL
The first two points of petitioner's brief comprise his
response to appellant's opening brief.

This point will serve as

appellant's reply brief.
A.

Penalty phase

In response to the State's appellant's brief,
petitioner maintains that the prejudice prong of the effective
assistance test is met because trial counsel did not call a
psychologist to present more evidence of "organic brain
syndrome."

As noted in the State's opening brief, trial counsel

contacted several mental health specialists to find someone who
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would testify on petitioner's behalf; they were singularly
unsuccessful.
There is no evidence that petitioner actually has
organic brain syndrome; although there was some suggestion at
trial of brain damage (Tr. 2796).

The weight of the evidence in

the trial record indicates that petitioner does not have organic
brain syndrome (Tr. 2810, 2811, 2816).

Dr. Heinbecker never

testified that he would have concluded differently given more
time and information, only that he "would have liked to have
planned the evaluation more carefully."

(Evidentiary hearing on

postconviction petition [hereafter H.] 216). Petitioner's
arguments are based on sheer speculation and do not support a
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.

State v. Frame/

723 P.2d 401, 405 (1986) (claim must be a demonstrative reality).
B.

On appeal

Petitioner claims that Edward Brass was operating under
an actual conflict of interest because he had represented the
codefendant, the woman accused of supplying the gun (whose case
was resolved separately from petitioner's).

The postconviction

court concluded that there was no conflict because of the prior
representation of the codefendant (Memorandum Decision at 27;
Addendum).

Because petitioner has not challenged this

conclusion, his claim of an actual conflict based on multiple
representation should be rejected.

As noted in Point II, only if

there is an actual conflict of interest which adversely affects
counsel's performance is prejudice presumed.
-11-

Cuvler v. Sullivan,

446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980).

Since the postconviction court found

no actual conflict, the burden was on petitioner to establish
prejudice; he has failed to do so.
INTRODUCTION TO BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE
The remaining points of this brief respond to the
issues raised by petitioner in his cross-appeal on the claims
rejected by the postconviction court.

Except for the claims

raised under Points III and X of petitioner's brief, i.e., the
claims surrounding ineffective assistance of counsel and the
refusal to appoint investigators and expert witnesses for
postconviction proceedings, the issues could and should have been
raised by petitioner in his direct appeal. As the State argued
below, these claims are procedurally barred and this Court should
reject them on that basis.

See Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029,

1035-36 (Utah 1989); Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah
1983); Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816 (Utah), cert, denied, 449
U.S. 891 (1980).
POINT II
THE COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT TRIAL
COUNSEL DID NOT HAVE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST
AND DID NOT PROVIDE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL IN THE AREAS STATED IN POINT III OF
PETITIONER'S BRIEF
The court denied postconviction relief on several other
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

In general,

when reviewing an appeal from a denial of a postconviction
petition, appellate courts "survey the record in the light most
favorable to the findings and judgment; and . . . will not
-12-

reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to support the
trial court's refusal to be convinced that the writ should be
granted."

Medina v. Cook, 779 P.2d 658, 658 (Utah 1989).
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are mixed

questions of fact and law.

State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186

(Utah 1990) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984)).

This Court has adopted a two-part test for determining

ineffectiveness from Strickland.

That test is:

"First, the [petitioner] must show that
counsel's performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as
the 'counsel' guaranteed the [petitioner] by
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the
[petitioner] must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were
so serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of
a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable."
Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
Petitioner has the burden of meeting both parts of the
test.
[I]n order to meet the first part of this
test a [petitioner] must "identify the acts
or omissions" which, under the circumstances,
"show that counsel's representation fell
below an objective standard of
reasonableness." . . . The appellate court
must . . . "indulge in the strong presumption
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance;
that is the [petitioner] must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances,
the challenged action 'might be considered
sound trial strategy.'"
Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 68890).

The standard for judging counsel's performance is that of
-13-

reasonableness.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91.

To prove

prejudice, petitioner
"must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome."
Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 187 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
"[T]hese principles are not to be applied as a
mechanical test."

State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).

This Court
"need not determine whether counsel's
performance was deficient before examining
the prejudice suffered by [petitioner] as a
result of the alleged deficiencies. . . . If
it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice, which we expect will often be so,
that course should be followed."
Id. at 405 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).
A.

Conflict of interest

Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel had a
conflict of interest which deprived petitioner of his
constitutional right to counsel.

On this issue, the court

stated:
Based on the briefs submitted, this Court is
of the opinion that the problems regarding
the Valdezes [trial counsel, Andrew and James
Valdez] representing petitioner was [sic]
discussed with petitioner and petitioner
waived any issue of conflict of interest and
petitioner agreed to allow the Valdezes to
continue their representation of petitioner.
There is still the issue whether
independent counsel's advice should have been
provided to petitioner to advise him of the
-14-

implications of the conflict of interest
problem. The Court rules though there may be
some evidence of a conflict and as a result,
some deficiency in representation, because of
the weight of the direct evidence of
petitioner's guilt, there is no prejudice
beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Memorandum Decision at pp. 22-23; Addendum).1
*The memorandum decision has raised the question of whether
the court applied a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to
petitioner's burden to show prejudice in an ineffective
assistance claim (Brief of Cross-Appellant at 37). The court's
syntax is confusing at best. In ruling on the first issue, use
of hypnotically enhanced testimony, the court found "the
admission of such alleged testimony was harmless error beyond a
reasonable doubt" (Memorandum Decision at 9; Addendum A ) . That
clause should be read that the court found admission of the
testimony to be error but that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. At the conclusion of the same sentence, the
court stated, "[T]here is no likelihood the result would have
been any different for either the guilt or penalty phase beyond a
reasonable doubt" (Memorandum Decision at 9; Addendum A ) . Again
the confusing statement should be read that the court found
beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no likelihood of a
different result.
On the next issue, failure to advise of a right to
testify, the court found that the failure was not error, "and if
it was, it was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, based on
the weight of the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt."
(Memorandum Decision at 10; Addendum A ) . The court again was
ruling that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt;
there is no indication that it was imposing a reasonable doubt
burden on petitioner.
On the issue of petitioner's right to be present, the
court found that there was no violation, "and if there was, it
was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt based on the weight
of the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt" (Memorandum
Decision at 12; Addendum A). The reasonable doubt standard was
imposed on the showing that any error was harmless, not on
petitioner.
The court imposed the same standard on the harmless
error analysis in the issues of consideration of the victim's
character (Memorandum Decision at 13; Addendum A ) , and failure to
instruct on statutory mitigating circumstances
(Memorandum
Decision at 31; Addendum A ) . The court stated no standard when
it found that there was no ineffectiveness in the way the defense
that the killing was unintentional was presented, in the failure
to object to the hypnotically enhanced testimony, and in the
advice that petitioner testify; it merely stated that prejudice
-15-

had not been established because of the weight of the evidence of
petitioner's guilt (Memorandum Decision at 15-16; Addendum A ) .
In
contrast,
the
court
stated
that
other
ineffectiveness claims may have indicated some deficiency but
counsel's actions were not prejudicial beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Memorandum Decision at 19, 21 f 23, 26). Other issues do not
even mention the prejudice prong.
In light of this confusion, petitioner claims that the
court applied an "erroneous legal standard in requiring Mr.
Gardner to show beyond a reasonable doubt the result would have
been different but for counsel's errors and omissions." (Brief
of Cross-Appellant at 37). Since the decision states the court's
conclusion about whether any error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt or whether there was, beyond a reasonable doubt,
no likelihood of a different result in a variety of ways, this
Court must determine whether an erroneous standard was applied or
merely whether the court's drafting was poor.
The court was never asked to impose a reasonable doubt
burden on the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness claim and
the majority of the statements regarding that burden refer to a
finding of harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt because of the
weight of the direct evidence of guilt. The few times the court
seems to be saying that petitioner had to prove prejudice beyond
a reasonable doubt should be read as findings beyond a reasonable
doubt that there was no prejudice.
This
conclusion
is
supported
by
the
court's
summarization of its decision. The court stated:
Because many of the contentions were resolved
by this Court on the basis of harmless error
and thus no prejudice beyond a reasonable
doubt because of the great weight of the
direct evidence, petitioner no doubt queries
how many harmless errors need there be to
constitute deprivation of due process. . . .
The Court has weighed each independently, and
collectively, and still finds that the weight
of the direct evidence is so great that the
collective effect is still insufficient to
overcome the overwhelming direct evidence of
petitioner's guilt.
Particularly in respect to the ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, the Court has
found no prejudice to petitioner beyond a
reasonable doubt because of the overwhelming
direct evidence of guilt.
(Memorandum Decision at 32; Addendum A). The court's finding of
"overwhelming direct evidence of guilt," read in the context of
the convoluted syntax, demonstrates that the court was not
imposing a reasonable doubt standard on petitioner's burden to
establish prejudice.
Instead, the court found beyond a
-16-

Petitioner's claim of conflict of interest has three
components:

1) counsel should have withdrawn because they were

potential witnesses; 2) counsel should have withdrawn because
they knew the bailiff who was wounded by petitioner after the
murder; and 3) there was animosity between petitioner and
counsel, particularly Andrew Valdez.
1.

Counsel as witnesses

The vast majority of the cases regarding conflict of
interest involve joint representation of codefendants, or counsel
having also represented a potential witness for the prosecution.
The claim raised heref that counsel themselves were potential
witnesses, is rare and little case law was found to give
guidance.

The claim arises from rule 3.7, Rules of Professional

Conduct,2 which states:

"A lawyer shall not act as advocate at

a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary
witness[.]"

As the Utah Court of Appeals stated in State v.

Johnson, 823 P.2d 484 (Utah App. 1991):
While violation of the Rules does not "create
any presumption that a legal duty has been
breached" or provide a basis for civil
liability, Scope, Utah R. Prof. Conduct,
courts have referred to the Rules to augment
legal principles involving lawyer conduct.
Id. at 489.

reasonable doubt that there was no prejudice because of the
overwhelming evidence of guilt.
2

The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct replaced the earlier
Utah Canons of Professional Responsibility.
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The legal principles involving conflict of interest
arise most often in multiple representation cases.

The impact of

multiple representation on the effective assistance of counsel
was addressed in Cuvler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), in
which the Supreme Court stated:
In order to establish a violation of the
Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised no
objection at trial must demonstrate that an
actual conflict of interest adversely
affected his lawyer's performance.
Id. at 348 (footnote omitted).

The Court also stated that

a defendant who shows that a conflict of
interest actually affected the adequacy of
his representation need not demonstrate
prejudice in order to obtain relief. . . .
But until a defendant shows that his counsel
actively represented conflicting interests,
he has not established the constitutional
predicate for his claim of ineffective
assistance.
Id. at 349-50 (citing Hollowav v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 487-91
(1978) and Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 72-75 (1942)).
The mere "possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a
criminal conviction."

Cuvler, 446 U.S. at 350.

See also

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (conflict of
interest warranting a presumption of prejudice is limited to
"when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest.").
The Utah Court of Appeals addressed an alleged conflict
of interest in State v. Hovt, 806 P.2d 204 (Utah App. 1991), in a
claim that trial counsel had a conflict because she had applied
and interviewed for a position with the county attorney's office
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handling the prosecution.

The court stated that in order to

succeed on the claim
defendant must "point to specific instances
in the record to suggest an actual conflict
or impairment of his or her interests. . . ."
. . . Defendant cannot claim error based on
the mere appearance or hypothetical existence
of conflict.
Id. at 212 (citing State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 75 (Utah App.
1990)).

This statement, while not controlling in this Court, is

a logical and appropriate burden to place on a petitioner
requesting a reversal of his conviction and sentence on the basis
of conflict of interest in his counsel.
Petitioner has failed to carry this burden.

The mere

fact that his counsel had seen him shortly after the shooting did
not make them "necessary" witnesses and does not establish an
actual conflict or impairment of petitioner's interests.

In

State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650 (Utah 1985), this Court stated
"that it is error for counsel to continue representation where he
or she is or ought to be a witness with respect to issues that
are not incidental or insignificant."

JEci. at 653. However, in

Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991), the
Court said:
we deem it to be generally inadvisable for
members of the bar to testify in litigation
where they personally represent a party. The
need for the testimony of counsel must be
compelling and must be necessary to preserve
the cause of action as set forth in rule
Id. at 1066 (emphasis added).

Counsel should not be witnesses

every time they have some information regarding a case; the rule
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requires a showing that the lawyer is "likely to be a necessary
witness[.]"

Utah R. Prof, Cond. 3.7(a) (emphasis added).

The only evidence regarding whether the trial counsel
were necessary witnesses came from counsel themselves.

Counsel

were not necessary witnesses because of their minimal contact
with petitioner on the grounds of the courthouse and the fact
that their concern and focus was on each other's welfare and not
on petitioner (H. 137). Andrew Valdez testified that his own
observations of petitioner that morning "might have" cut against
the defense used, i.e., that petitioner was unaware of his
actions because of his wound (H. 137). James Valdez testified
that he had nothing to add in the way of evidence because he saw
petitioner after the fact and would not have been able to
indicate petitioner's state of mind at the time of the murder (H.
199).

Since counsel were not necessary and compelled witnesses,

there was no actual conflict in their representation of
petitioner.
2.

Counsel knew the injured bailiff

Petitioner next claims that his trial counsel had a
conflict because they knew the bailiff shot by petitioner and
other court personnel who were witnesses.

Petitioner has failed

to demonstrate how that knowledge raised any actual conflict of
interest which adversely affected his counsel's performance;
consequently, he has failed to establish "the constitutional
predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance."
U.S. at 350.
-20-

Cuvler, 446

3.

Animosity between counsel and petitioner

The final conflict claim is that there was animosity
between petitioner and his counsel, specifically Andrew Valdez.
Again, petitioner has failed to demonstrate how his relationship
with his counsel raised any actual conflict of interest which
adversely affected counsel's performance.

At the postconviction

evidentiary hearing, petitioner testified that he asked Valdez to
withdraw because:

1) he felt Valdez was not keeping him

informed, 2) petitioner did not like his conditions of
confinement, 3) petitioner did not want his mother to testify,
and 4) petitioner did not want to testify (H. 87-91).

Petitioner

did not convey his problems with counsel to the trial judge (H.
87).

His counsel agreed that petitioner had expressed

frustration with his confinement conditions and had had
"problems" with the presentation of penalty phase witnesses (H.
117) .
Petitioner has not established that his rocky
relationship with counsel adversely affected counsel's
performance.

He has shown no specific instances where an alleged

failure to keep petitioner informed adversely affected the
proceedings.

Likewise, there is no demonstration that the

dispute about his confinement raised ineffective assistance;
indeed, counsel persuaded petitioner not to plead guilty during
trial when petitioner wanted to do so solely to avoid the
confinement conditions.

Petitioner's mother did not testify at

the trial and petitioner admits that ultimately it was his own
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decision to testify (H. 91). Petitioner has not demonstrated
that that decision, whether "coerced" by counsel or not, was the
basis for an ineffective assistance claim.
B.

Other claims of ineffective assistance

Petitioner next challenges the postconviction court's
ruling that several other allegations of ineffective assistance
of counsel did not justify relief.
Petitioner's first claim is that counsel failed to
adequately present the defense that he shot Burdell as a reaction
to having been wounded.

The postconviction court concluded that

even if there had been deficient performance in this area, the
direct evidence of petitioner's guilt was so overwhelming that no
prejudice was established (Memorandum Decision at 14-15;
Addendum).
Petitioner speculates that there was other evidence
counsel could have presented to support this claim.

However, he

failed to establish the existence of any evidence that a
ballistics expert or thoracic specialist might offer to support
the theory and obtain a different result at trial.

Indeed,

Andrew Valdez testified that counsel looked for evidence to
support the theory; however, the medical personnel at the
hospital where petitioner was taken weakened that theory.
"Basically they indicated that he was very lucid and knew what he
was doing."

(H. 132). Thus, petitioner has failed to establish

either a deficiency in counsel's representation or prejudice.
Speculation about a different outcome is insufficient to
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establish that counsel was inadequate.

State v. Buelr 700 P.2d

701 (Utah 1985); State v. White, 671 P.2d 191 (Utah 1983).
claim must be a demonstrable reality.

The

State v. Frame, 723 P.2d

401, 405 (Utah 1986).
Secondly, petitioner argues that counsel's advice that
petitioner should testify established constitutionally inadequate
representation.

Counsel testified that there was no way to

present petitioner's state of mind to the jury other than by
petitioner's own testimony (H. 175-76).

He also stated that

petitioner wanted his story told and counsel did not think he
could have kept petitioner off of the stand (H. 157, 176).
Petitioner admitted he made the decision to testify (H. 93). In
the face of the evidence from which the jury could infer that
petitioner intended to kill Burdell, petitioner's testimony was
the only evidence that would give the jury a different view of
the events.

Even if experts could have shared some insight into

the possible effects of petitioner's wound, only petitioner could
say what he actually experienced.

The postconviction court found

no deficient performance or prejudice in this strategy
(Memorandum Decision at 16; Addendum).
The advice given by counsel was sound and was a
legitimate tactical decision.

Counsel's strategic decisions are

not grounds for an ineffectiveness finding.

State v. Bullock,

791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024
(1990); Buel, 700 P.2d at 701; State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 59
(Utah 1982).

There is a strong presumption that counsel's
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decisions on what theories of defense to pursue were tactical.
Bullock, 791 P.2d at 160; State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023
(Utah 1987); Buel, 700 P.2d at 703. Attorneys are given broad
discretion to make strategic choices at trial and courts should
not evaluate their decisions using the benefit of hindsight.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-91. The fact that counsel's chosen
strategy did not produce the desired result does not lead to a
conclusion of ineffectiveness.

Bullock, 791 P.2d at 160; Medina,

738 P.2d at 1023-24; Buel, 700 P.2d at 703.
In fact, counsel prepared petitioner well for the
prospect of testifying.

Another attorney, Ron Yengich, consulted

about the decision and engaged petitioner in mock cross
examination (H. 154-55).

Counsel also informed petitioner that

he would be asked to reveal the identity of his accomplice and
that failure to do so would hurt petitioner (H. 155). Although
counsel also knew that Wayne Jorgensen's testimony about what
defendant had told him at the hospital where petitioner recovered
from his wound3 would be used to rebut petitioner's testimony,
counsel believed Jorgensen was impeachable (H. 153). Jorgensen
was questioned by counsel regarding the fact that he did not come
forward with his information immediately, nor prepare any kind of
report at the time of the statements (H. 153, Tr. 2491).

3

Jorgensen testified that petitioner said he shot Burdell
because he thought he looked as though he would jump petitioner
(Tr. 2486). Petitioner also told Jorgensen that he would have
killed anyone who tried to stop him or get in his way (Tr. 248788).
-24-

A defendant claiming that he disagreed with counsel's
approach at the time of trial generally must have registered a
complaint about that approach at the time of trial in order to
preserve the claim.

Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023.

If the conflict

arose out of a dispute about what witnesses to present and what
defenses to raise, courts usually do not look behind the
decisions of trial counsel even if a complaint was registered at
trial.

State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah 1982), cert, denied,

459 U.S. 988 (1982).

The fact remains that petitioner chose to

testify and registered no complaints during trial.
Thirdly, petitioner contends that counsel was
ineffective for introducing petitioner's prior criminal history
on direct examination.

The postconviction court again found

that, even though counsel's performance may have been deficient,
the evidence of petitioner's guilt was so strong that there was,
beyond a reasonable doubt, no prejudice (Memorandum Decision at
19; Addendum).
Petitioner asserts that the convictions were
inadmissible.

Under recent case law, the State would be required

to show that the probative value of petitioner's criminal history
outweighed its prejudicial effect on petitioner before it could
introduce the evidence to impeach.
1325 (Utah 1986).

State v. Banner, 717 P.2d

Also, the State, if trying this case today,

would be precluded from using convictions for theft, robbery and
burglary unless there was evidence that the crimes involved
dishonesty or false statements or were otherwise more probative
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than prejudicial.

State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989).

However, the case law interpreting rule 609, Utah Rules of
Evidence, was not in existence at the time of petitioner's trial.
Prior to 1986, despite the commentators' notes to rule 609,
courts had not applied the rule any differently than the previous
rule which allowed admission of all of a defendant's felony
criminal history as impeachment.

See Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334,

n. 40 and n. 45. Moreover, case law existing at the time of
trial specifically defined crimes such as theft, robbery and
burglary as crimes of dishonesty.
33, 34 (Utah 1984).

See State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d

Even though Cintron was decided under the

former rules of evidence, the language of former rule 21 was
exactly the same as rule 609(a).

Utah's adoption of the federal

definition of crimes of dishonesty in Bruce and State v. Lanier,
778 P.2d 9 (Utah 1989), was a clear break with this past rule; a
break which occurred after petitioner's trial.
Additionally, it is not clear that petitioner's
criminal history would have been excluded.

Counsel did discuss

the introduction of the evidence and the State's agreement that
the prosecutor would not delve into the details of the crimes
(Tr. 2396).

Had the issue been presented to the trial court, it

might very well have concluded that, petitioner's criminal
history being so extensive, he had a motive to fabricate his
testimony to avoid a first degree murder conviction and potential
death sentence and found that the evidence was very probative.
Petitioner had nothing to lose and everything to gain by lying.
•26-

Furthermore, the jury was already aware that petitioner had some
sort of criminal history since he was escaping from prison at the
time he shot Burdell and two robbery convictions were admitted to
establish an aggravating circumstance.

Admission of petitioner's

additional criminal history was harmless in the face of the
overwhelming evidence of guilt.

Petitioner has failed to

establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's introduction of the
evidence.
Next, petitioner claims that he was prejudiced by
counsel's failure to request a bifurcated guilt phase to avoid
introduction of his previous convictions that were used as an
aggravating circumstance of first degree murder.

The

postconviction court found no requirement to make such a request;
consequently, there was no deficient performance.

Neither was

there prejudice because of the evidence of petitioner's guilt
(Memorandum Decision at 19; Addendum).
At the time of petitioner's trial, courts were not
required to bifurcate the guilt phase of a trial where the
previous convictions were introduced to establish an element of
the charged offense.

In State v. James, 767 P.2d 549 (Utah

1989), this Court required for the first time that a first degree
murder trial be bifurcated to avoid exposing the jury to evidence
of previous criminal history before they determine whether a
defendant killed intentionally.

Notably, the Court in

petitioner's case refused to reach this issue based upon a lack
of prejudice resulting from the "overwhelming direct evidence" of
-27-

petitioner's guilt.

Gardner, 789 P.2d at 279.

Finally, given

that defendant was in custody and shackled at the time of the
escape and murder, the jury would have had to have been aware
that petitioner had some criminal history/
Because petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the
postconviction court's ruling that counsel was not ineffective in
these areas was erroneous, this Court should affirm that
decision.
POINT III
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED POSTCONVICTION
RELIEF ON THE ISSUE OF THE USE OF
HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY
There is no question that hypnotically enhanced
testimony is inadmissible at trial.

State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d

1203, 1210 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1018 (1990); State
v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1989).

Anything recalled

by a witness only after hypnosis must be suppressed; however, a
witness who has been hypnotized may testify to his pre-hypnosis
recollections as they were recorded before hypnosis.

Tuttle, 780

P.2d at 1211. Admission of posthypnotic recall can be harmless
error so long as it appears unlikely beyond a reasonable doubt
^Petitioner has apparently abandoned some of his claims of
ineffective assistance. Claims addressed below under this rubric
but not addressed on appeal are: 1) counsel's failure to object
to Macri's hypnotically refreshed testimony; 2) counsel's failure
to assure that all disagreements between petitioner and counsel
were made part of the record; 3) counsel's failure to challenge
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(c) as an aggravating factor; 4)
counsel's failure to make an opening statement at the penalty
phase; and 5) counsel's failure to adequately voir dire the jury.
The postconviction court found no prejudice in these claims
(Memorandum Decision at 26-27; Addendum A ) .
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that the result of the trial would have been different1213.

Id. at

This depends upon factors such as "the importance of the

witness's testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative,
whether the testimony was corroborated or contradicted, and the
overall strength of the State's case."

Id.

The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing
established that Robert Macri, a witness at trial, underwent
hypnosis after the preliminary hearing and prior to trial (H. 27,
47, 60). Although there were no video or audio tapes of the
session, both Mr. Macri and the hypnotist, Dr. Elliott Landau,
testified that no facts were suggested to Mr. Macri (H. 47-48,
66-68).

In fact, Dr. Landau asked only general questions such

as, "Can you see where you are?" (H. 63). He asked no questions
of Mr. Macri regarding the facts of the shooting of Michael
Burdell (H. 48, 64-65, 69). Some time after he was hypnotized,
Mr. Macri claims to have recalled that he closed the door of the
clerk's office as he ran out of the room (H. 28-29).
The postconviction court agreed that use of
posthypnotic testimony was error; however, the court concluded
that the testimony was not critical and its admission was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (Memorandum Decision at 8-9;
Addendum).

This conclusion is amply supported by the record.

This aspect of Robert Macri's testimony was not critical to the
State's case.

Another witness testified to defendant's actions

in the clerk's office.

Ed Seamons observed petitioner as he

aimed the gun at Burdell's head from within one foot and paused a
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second or two before firing (Tr. 2156-57, 2202).

Seamons said

that Macri immediately pushed the door closed, running around it
and out of the room (Tr. 2158).

Seamons's testimony not only

rendered Macri's trial testimony about how the door closed
cumulative, it corroborated Macri's trial testimony.

There is no

allegation that Seamons' testimony was tainted by hypnosis or
that it changed between preliminary hearing and trial.
Significantly, Macri's trial testimony was not
"dramatically different" from his preliminary hearing testimony
as petitioner alleges. At preliminary hearing, Macri described
feeling exposed to petitioner either by the door closing or by
petitioner moving far enough into the room to look behind the
door (Preliminary hearing transcript [hereafter P.H.] 971-72).
In both instances, Macri stated that petitioner looked at him and
Burdell and said, "Oh fu . . ." (P.H. 948, Tr. 2238).
confirmed petitioner's exclamation (Tr. 2155).

Seamons

According to

Macri at both hearings, petitioner then pointed the gun at Macri,
but moved it toward Burdell when Burdell let out an exclamation
(P.H. 949, Tr. 2217).

Only then did petitioner fire the gun.

Additionally, Seamons explained that petitioner had
backed into the room once before and had looked at the two
attorneys before going back out to the elevator (Tr. 2151-53).
At the elevator, petitioner tried to push the buttons but his
arms were restrained by the waist shackle and he was unable to
reach the buttons (Tr. 2153).

When petitioner returned to the

clerk's office (Tr. 2153), then, he already knew the two
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attorneys were there.

Petitioner was not surprised by their

presence behind the door.
The State's case against petitioner was very strong in
other respects.

First, there was no question of identity;

petitioner was escaping from custody at the time of the shooting.
There was other evidence of petitioner's intent; he raised the
gun from a relaxed position and shot a uniformed bailiff almost
immediately after shooting Burdell (Tr. 2006-07, 2277).
Petitioner's gun had to be intentionally cocked in a separate
action each time he fired it (Tr. 2363).

Petitioner took a

hostage from the clerk's office and up the stairs (Tr. 2251-52,
2254, 2278-79, 2163).

Once up the stairs, petitioner took

another hostage, telling him, "You are next. Walk with me" (Tr.
2297).

All of these events occurred within moments of the

initial escape (Tr. 1995, 2038-41, 2056, 2209, 2246, 2303-04,
2312-13); an escape which petitioner had planned (Tr. 2405-08,
2433, 2442).
Even if petitioner fired the gun as a reaction to the
door's movement, that fact does not negate his intent to kill.
Petitioner was voluntarily engaged in an attempt to escape
custody.

He had already seen the two men behind the door the

first time he entered the room.

Simply because he fired the gun

in reaction to movement does not mean he did not form the intent
to kill whoever he perceived was making a move toward him from
behind the door. As he stated to Jorgensen, petitioner would
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have killed anyone who tried to stop him from escaping (Tr. 248687).
Tuttle does not require reversal where the use of
hypnotically refreshed testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.

780 P.2d at 1213. One reason petitioner claims that the

testimony was harmful is that none of the suggested safeguards
for testing the reliability of Macri's testimony were followed.
Petitioner overlooks that we do have a recording of Macri's prehypnosis recall—the preliminary hearing transcript.

The only

difference between the two versions of events is that by the time
of trial, Macri was sure how the door was closed.

As

demonstrated above, this fact was insignificant, was cumulative
to other testimony and was corroborated by other testimony.
Moreover, it did nothing to negate evidence of petitioner's
intent to kill.
In short, petitioner's attempt to fashion the "swinging
door" into a defense in the postconviction proceeding is not
supported by any of the evidence presented at either the
preliminary hearing or the trial. Macri's belated recollection
about how the door closed was insignificant and the fact that it
may have been produced by hypnosis does not warrant granting
postconviction relief; as the postconviction court determined,
there is no likelihood of a different trial result absent Macri's
testimony about the door.
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POINT IV
THE POSTCONVICTION COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ADVISE
PETITIONER THAT HE DID NOT HAVE TO TESTIFY
Petitioner claims that the postconviction court should
have granted relief because the trial court did not advise
petitioner "concerning his right to testify or remain silent"
(Brief of Cross-Appellant at 48-49).

The postconviction court

determined that the trial court's failure to advise concerning a
right to testify was not error or, at most, harmless error
(Memorandum Decision at 10; Addendum).
The cases cited by petitioner do not support his claim
that the trial court had an obligation to advise defendant about
a right to testify.

The United States Supreme Court cases cited

stand for the propositions that:

1) the State may not

arbitrarily limit the constitutional right to testify on one's
own behalf, Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987); 2) a state rule
requiring defendant to testify before calling other defense
witnesses or be precluded from testifying violates a
constitutional right to silence, Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S.
605 (1972); and 3) a state law requiring response to questioning
by a referee violates a constitutional right to silence, Mallov
v. Hocxan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).

None of these cases address

petitioner's claim.
The Colorado case cited also is unavailing.

People v.

Curtis, 681 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1984), declares that the right to
testify is so fundamental that its waiver requires testing by the
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same constitutional standards applied to waiver of the right to
counsel.

In Curtis, the defendant's right to testify overrode

his counsel's advice to waive the right.

Id.

at 514. Waiver of

the right to testify may require a colloquy establishing
knowledge and voluntariness; there is no similar colloquy
requirement for a decision to. testify.

Consequently, there was

no constitutional violation because the court did not advise
petitioner that he did not have to testify.
POINT V
THE POSTCONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED
THAT PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT ALL
CRITICAL STAGES OF THE PROCEEDINGS WAS
SUBSTANTIALLY OBSERVED
Respondent agrees that a criminal defendant has a right
to be present at all critical stages of the criminal proceeding.
However, the postconviction court correctly determined that this
right was not infringed (Memorandum Decision at 11-12; Addendum).
The trial transcripts indicate that there were two hearings on
motions to recuse the trial judge (Tr. 1105-24, 1125-36).
hearings were held on July 12 and July 17, 1985.

These

The record

indicates on both days that petitioner was present (Tr. 1105,
1125).

At his request, petitioner left the hearing on July 12;

however, that was only after the court continued the hearing to
the later date.

Further argument on petitioner's motion was

conducted on July 17 and the decision rendered on the later date
(Tr. 1136-37).

The hearing on the motion for a change of venue

was held on August 5, 1985, and the record shows that petitioner
was present at that hearing (Tr. 1149).
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Since petitioner was

present at the hearings at which his motions were argued and
decided, there was no violation of a right to presence.
Petitioner has presented no analysis, case law, or
argument to support a claim that the court's review of exhibits
without counsel or petitioner being present was a violation of a
constitutional right.

This Court may decline to address this

issue on that basis alone.

Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); State v.

Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984).
Neither has petitioner demonstrated error in the
postconviction court's decision that the right to presence was
substantially observed.

He has pointed to nothing in the record

that conflicts with that finding.
POINT VI
THE POSTCONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED
THAT THE INFORMATION DISCLOSED TO THE JURY
ABOUT THE VICTIM DOES NOT WARRANT GRANTING
THE RELIEF REQUESTED
Petitioner maintains that the postconviction court
erred in determining that the evidence or argument presented
about the victim's character did not justify postconviction
relief.

The two cases relied on by petitioner, South Carolina v.

Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496
(1987), had not been decided at the time of petitioner's trial,
and were subsequently overruled in Payne v. Tennessee,
, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1992).

U.S.

What existed prior to Booth to

guide prosecutors in selecting appropriate argument to capital
juries is best demonstrated by reference to the dissenting
opinion in Gathers.

As the dissenters noted, the Supreme Court
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"has long recognized that retribution itself is a valid
penological goal of the death penalty."

Gathers, 490 U.S. at 818

(O'Connor, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell and Stevens, JJ.)).

Prior to the decisions in Booth and

Gathers, prosecutors were justified in arguing that retribution
for the harm done to the victim and his family or friends was an
appropriate factor for jurors to consider.
In Booth, the Court held that a victim impact statement
could not be given to the jury in the sentencing phase of a
capital case.

The Court's concern was that the jury would focus

on the impact of the victim's death upon his family members as
emphasized by an extensive written statement, and choose to
impose the death penalty as a result of that impact rather than
as a result of the jury's reasoned moral response to the
defendant and his crime.

482 U.S. at 505. The Court held that

Maryland's capital sentencing statute requiring the jury to
consider such information was unconstitutional.
In Gathers, the Court upheld the South Carolina Supreme
Court's reversal of a death sentence where the State had
introduced extensive evidence establishing that the victim was a
religious man.

The State had argued extensively that death

should be imposed upon Gathers because the victim was a
registered voter, a religious man who carried a prayer card with
him at all times, and one who cared about the community.
Ct. at 2210.

109 S.

The Court was concerned that the jury focused upon
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the victim's characteristics rather than upon those of the
defendant at the penalty phase.
The postconviction court in the present case found no
reason to try to apply Gathers and Booth retroactively because
the emphasis on Burdell's character was "minimal in comparison to
the total evidence presented, and was further minimized by the
instructions given" (Memorandum Decision at 13; Addendum).

Even

if those cases had been applied retroactively, the facts of the
present case would not violate their holdings.

In this case, the

prosecutor did not focus extensively on the victim's
characteristics at the penalty phase of the trial; in fact, he
made no mention of those characteristics at the penalty phase.
He referenced them only minimally at the guilt phase (Tr. 253334).

Neither Booth nor Gathers indicate that any reference

whatsoever to the victim's life is always reversible error.

Both

cases involved extensive evidence which was stressed to the jury
at the penalty phase of the trial.

Here, the prosecutor's

remarks were a relatively minor portion of his argument at the
guilt phase.

Certainly neither case requires that the prosecutor

not point out that the victim had a general right to live.

This

was the thrust of the reference rather than that petitioner
should be convicted because Burdell was a particular type of
person.

Also, the instruction regarding the use of sympathy and

sentiment was given at the penalty phase as one of petitioner's
requested instructions (R. 528). At the guilt phase, the jury
was instructed that statements of counsel are not evidence (R.
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560).

Thus, the jury could not have concluded that they were to

regard counsel's argument as evidence of aggravation in the
penalty phase.
Given the minimal reference at trial to the victim's
character, the postconviction court properly concluded that there
was no error in the information disclosed to the jury; and, if
there were, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
(Memorandum Decision at 13; Addendum).
POINT VII
THE JURY WAS INSTRUCTED ON ALL APPROPRIATE
STATUTORY MITIGATING FACTORS
The postconviction court concluded that the statutory
mitigating factor regarding extreme duress was not supported by
the evidence and thus was properly rejected by the trial court5
(Memorandum Decision at 30-31; Addendum).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-

207(2)(c) (1990) indicates that mitigating factors for purposes
of capital sentencing include that "[t]he defendant acted under
extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another
personf.J"

Petitioner argues that "duress" should be construed

to include the "stress" caused by petitioner's wound.

5

This

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1990) lists certain aggravating
circumstances which elevate an intentional or knowing killing to
a capital offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (1990) also speaks
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances which a fact-finder
may consider in determining the appropriate sentence after a
defendant has been adjudged guilty of the capital offense. For
purposes of clarity, this brief shall refer to the aggravating
circumstances for determining guilt as "circumstances;" the
circumstances applicable to the sentencing provision shall be
referred to as "factors."
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tortured reading of the concept of "duress" is not supported by
case law.
The term "duress" has been defined in the context of
the statutory defense to criminal prosecution of compulsion or
duress.

In State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986), this Court

adopted a modified test to evaluate a claim of a defense of
duress to a charge of escape from prison.

The first factor in

the test, as adopted from People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal.App.3d 823,
118 Cal.Rptr. 110 (Cal.App. 4th Dist. 1974), is that the person
"is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible sexual attack
or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future[.]"
Lovercamp, 43 Cal.App.3d at 831-32, 118 Cal.Rptr. at 115. As the
Arizona Court of Appeals said in State v. Lamar, 144 Ariz. 490,
698 P.2d 735 (Ariz. App. 1984):
Duress envisions a third person compelling a
person by the threat of immediate physical
violence to commit a crime against another
person or the property of another person.
Id., 144 Ariz, at 497, 698 P.2d at 742. The Alaska Court of
Appeals in Betzner v. State, 768 P.2d 1150 (Alaska App. 1989),
stated:
"Duress must consist of threatening conduct
which produces in the defendant a reasonable
fear of immediate or imminent death or
serious bodily harm."
Id. at 1155 (quoting W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook of Criminal
Law § 49 (1972)).

See also United States v. Campbell, 609 F.2d

922, 924 (8th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980)
("Basically a defense of duress or coercion requires that there
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be an immediate threat of death or serious bodily harm which
requires the defendant to commit the criminal act, and it must be
in a situation in which there was no opportunity to avoid the
danger.•')•
The definition of duress requiring a threat by a third
person parallels the rest of the clause in the capital sentencing
statute containing the duress language.

Subsection 76-3-

207(2)(c) involves proof that petitioner acted under extreme
duress "or under the substantial domination of another person[.]"
In order for an instruction to be given regarding this
subsection, evidence of duress or force from a third party was
required.

No such evidence was presented and the court properly

rejected the requested instruction.
In addition, the jury was instructed that it could
consider any other facts in aggravation or mitigation along with
the specifically listed factors (R. 613). The jury was also told
it could consider in mitigation any other factors which did not
justify or excuse the crime but which they might consider as
extenuating or reducing moral culpability (R. 614). They were
further told that the four listed factors were only examples of
some of the factors they might consider in mitigation (R. 616).
Thus, the jury was free to consider whether the fact that
petitioner had been wounded mitigated against the death penalty.
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POINT VIII
THE POSTCONVICTION COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S REJECTION OF
PETITIONER'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION THAT THE
JURY HAD TO FIND THE EXISTENCE OF AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT WAS
CORRECT
Petitioner next challenges the postconviction court's
determination that the trial court properly rejected petitioner's
requested instruction that the jury had to find the existence of
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt (Memorandum
Decision at 31-32; Addendum).

Petitioner's argument is based

upon two isolated sentences within two cases which were decided
after this Court reviewed petitioner's case.

E.g., State v.

Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989); State v. Holland, 777 P.2d
1019 (Utah 1989).

Neither case suggests that the jury must be

separately instructed to find the existence of aggravating
factors beyond a reasonable doubt when they have been instructed
in compliance with State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).

The Wood standard requires the jury

to find that total aggravation outweighs total mitigation beyond
a reasonable doubt and that death is the appropriate penalty in
the circumstances of the case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The

necessary implication of a Wood instruction is that the jury must
first find that aggravation exists before it can weigh the
aggravation against the mitigation.

No Utah case, however, has

ever required that the jury be separately instructed that they
may only consider aggravation which they find to exist beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has
-41-

never imposed such a requirement.

See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.

862, 874-75 (1983); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976).
POINT IX
DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO APPOINT INVESTIGATORS
AND EXPERT WITNESSES DID NOT VIOLATE
PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A month after filing his petition for postconviction
relief, petitioner filed a separate motion seeking appointment of
an investigator and expert witnesses at state expense.
motion was denied.

This

Petitioner argues that the failure to provide

investigators and expert witnesses violated his constitutional
rights to the effective assistance of counsel and due process.
Rule 54(d)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides
that M[c]osts against the state of Utah, its officers and
agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law."
Since petitioner is proceeding under rule 65B(b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, to obtain postconviction relief, this action is
governed by the rules of civil procedure.

Thus, petitioner must

establish that the costs he requested were "permitted by law."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 (1990) delineates the
"[m]inimum standards provided by county for defense of indigent
defendants."

It reads:

The following are minimum standards to be
provided by each county, city and town for
the defense of indigent persons in criminal
cases in the courts and various
administrative bodies of the state:
(1) Provide counsel for every indigent
person who faces the substantial
probability of the deprivation of his
liberty;
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(2) Afford timely representation by
competent legal counsel;
(3) Provide the investigatory and other
facilities necessary for a complete
defense:
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense
counsel to the client; and
(5) Include the taking of a first appeal
of right and the prosecuting of other
remedies before or after a conviction,
considered by the defending counsel to be
in the interest of justice except for
other and subsequent discretionary appeals
or discretionary writ proceedings.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 (emphasis added).

This section

specifically states that these standards are to be provided for
"the defense of indigent persons in criminal cases."

The present

case is not a criminal proceeding; neither is petitioner the
defendant in this action which is a collateral civil proceeding
brought by petitioner.

The right to appointed counsel "applies

only in criminal prosecutions, not civil actions."

Walker v.

Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372, 1374 (Utah App. 1987).
By its own operation, § 77-32-1 does not apply to
collateral civil proceedings.

Subsection 5 specifically excludes

discretionary writ proceedings.

To provide meaning to the phrase

"discretionary writ proceedings," the Court should look to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-32-3 (1990), which provides:
An assigned counsel shall not have the
duty or power under this section to represent
an indigent defendant in any discretionary
appeal or action for a discretionary writ,
other than in a meaningful first appeal of
right to assure the indigent defendant an
adequate opportunity to present his claims
fairly in the context of the appellate
process of this state.
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This section reiterates that discretionary writs are
postconviction actions other than those included in the original
appellate process.

The present proceeding is not part of the

first appeal of right from a criminal conviction; instead, it is
an appeal in a collateral civil proceeding.

Section 77-32-3,

read together with § 77-32-1, supports the postconviction court's
refusal to order the State to pay the costs of investigators and
expert witnesses for petitioner.
On appeal, and without citing to the Utah law set out
above, petitioner argues that denial of investigators and expert
witnesses deprived him of a constitutional right to due process
and effective assistance of counsel.

For support, he cites Ake

v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), a case in which the United
States Supreme Court held that when a criminal "defendant has
made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the
offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the
Constitution requires that a State provide access to a
psychiatrist's assistance on this issue if the defendant cannot
otherwise afford one." JId. at 74. Ake does not stand for the
proposition that a petitioner is entitled to a psychiatrist's
assistance in a collateral postconviction proceeding.

Petitioner

has provided no legal analysis supporting his extension of the
holding of Ake to collateral proceedings.
Comparing this argument to United States Supreme Court
cases regarding right to counsel, this extension is unwarranted.
For nearly twenty years, the Supreme Court has refused to extend
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its right to counsel holdings in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), to
collateral proceedings.

In Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974),

the Court held that neither the due process nor the equal
protection clauses require states to provide counsel to an
indigent defendant on a discretionary appeal to a state supreme
court or on a petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court. Jld.. at 610-12.

The policy behind this refusal to

extend the right to counsel is:
We do not believe that the Due Process
Clause requires North Carolina to provide
respondent with counsel on his discretionary
appeal to the State Supreme Court. At the
trial stage of a criminal proceeding, the
right of an indigent defendant to counsel is
fundamental and binding upon the States by
virtue of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Gideon[ 372 U.S. 335] . . . But
there are significant differences between the
trial and appellate stages of a criminal
proceeding. The purpose of the trial stage
from the State's point of view is to convert
a criminal defendant from a person presumed
innocent to one found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. To accomplish this
purpose, the State employs a prosecuting
attorney who presents evidence to the court,
challenges any witnesses offered by the
defendant, argues rulings of the court, and
makes direct arguments to the court and jury
seeking to persuade them of the defendant's
guilt. Under these circumstances "reason and
reflection require us to recognize that in
our adversary system of criminal justice, any
person haled into court, who is too poor to
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him." jid. at
344[.]
By contrast, it is ordinarily the
defendant, rather than the State, who
initiates the appellate process, seeking not
to fend off the efforts of the State's
prosecutor but rather to overturn a finding
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of guilt made by a judge or a jury below.
The defendant needs an attorney on appeal not
as a shield to protect him against being
"haled into court" by the State and stripped
of his presumption of innocence, but rather
as a sword to upset the prior determination
of guilt. This difference is significant
for, while no one would agree that the State
may simply dispense with the trial stage of
proceedings without a criminal defendant's
consent, it is clear that the State need not
provide any appeal at all. McKane v.
Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 14 S. Ct. 913, 38
L.Ed. 867 (1894). The fact that an appeal
has been provided does not automatically mean
that a State then acts unfairly by refusing
to provide counsel to indigent defendants at
every stage of the way,
Ross, 417 U.S. at 610-11 (emphasis in original).

The Court

stated that it did not intend to "discourage" states which have,
"as a matter of legislative choice, made counsel available to
convicted defendants at all stages of judicial review."
618.

Id., at

However, that choice is "a matter of legislative policy[.]"

id.
In Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982), the Court
reiterated that
[s]ince respondent had no constitutional
right to counsel [to pursue discretionary
state appeals or applications for review in
the United States Supreme Court], he could
not be deprived of the effective assistance
of counsel[.]
Id. at 587-88.

Relying on this series of cases, the Court in

Pennsylvania v. Finlev, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), said:
We think that since a defendant has no
federal constitutional right to counsel when
pursuing a discretionary appeal on direct
review of his conviction, a fortiori,
he has
no such right when attacking a conviction
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that has long since become final upon
exhaustion of the appellate process.
Id. at 555 (emphasis in original).

After restating the analysis

given in Ross, the Court continued:
Postconviction relief is even further removed
from the criminal trial than is discretionary
direct review. It is not part of the
criminal proceeding itself, and it is in fact
considered to be civil in nature. . . . It
is a collateral attack that normally occurs
only after the defendant has failed to secure
relief through direct review of his
conviction. States have no obligation to
provide this avenue of relief, . . . and when
they do, the fundamental fairness mandated by
the Due Process Clause does not require that
the State supply a lawyer as well.
Id. at 556-57 (citations omitted).

Neither was the "equal

protection guarantee of 'meaningful access' violated" by refusal
to provide counsel in postconviction proceedings.

^Id. at 557.

In Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, the Court extended
Finlev to capital cases.

The Court further said:

If, as we said in Barefoot v. Estelle, [463
U.S. 880 (1983)], direct appeal is the
primary avenue for review of capital cases as
well as other sentences, Virginia may quite
sensibly decide to concentrate the resources
it devotes to providing attorneys for capital
defendants at the trial and appellate stages
of a capital proceeding. Capable lawyering
there would mean fewer colorable claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel to be
litigated on collateral attack.
Id. at 11.
The United States Supreme Court has given sound policy
reasons for its refusal to extend a right to appointed counsel at
the trial and first appeal stages to discretionary and collateral
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proceedings*

These policy reasons also apply to the appointment

of investigators and expert witnesses.
Petitioner had an opportunity at trial to present
evidence about his mental state at the time of the murder.

His

counsel presented the best evidence they had of his mental state;
petitioner testified as to his thought processes, and another
witness testified that petitioner looked "confused" (Tr. at
1260).

When asked at the postconviction evidentiary hearing

about calling expert witnesses to "bolster" the theory that the
shooting was not intentional, Andrew Valdez testified that "[i]t
was hard to bolster that theory" (H. 132).
We couldn't get medical doctors from the
University of Utah to support that.
Basically they indicated that he was very
lucid and knew what he was doing.
(H. 132). Expert evidence to support petitioner's theory that he
was confused and fired the gun unintentionally would have been
belied by the testimony of the medical personnel who actually
worked with petitioner after the shooting.

Given the evidence

forthcoming from people who observed petitioner at the time of
the crime and shortly after, it is highly speculative that expert
witnesses in this postconviction proceeding could have provided
any testimony that would form the basis for granting the
petition.
In one sentence, petitioner's brief intimates that the
failure to appoint expert psychiatric assistance also deprived
him of the effective assistance of counsel (Brief of CrossAppellant at 59-60).

As noted above, there is no constitutional
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right to counsel in discretionary postconviction proceedings;
consequently, any right to psychiatric assistance based on a
right to counsel does not attach to these proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the portion of the decision of the trial
court granting postconviction relief and affirm the portion of
the decision which denied such relief.
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ADDENDUM

JUL 3 0 1991
OFFICE Or
ATTORNEY GENSFttL
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

RONNIE LEE GARDNER,

CIVIL NO.

Petitioner,

900904092

vs.
TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden of
Utah State Prison, State of
Utah,
Respondent.

Petitioner

Ronnie

Lee

Gardner's

evidentiary

hearing

on

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or for Post Conviction
Relief was heard by this Court on November 27 and 28, 1990.
Petitioner was present and represented by his attorneys Craig
L. Truman, Karen A. Chaney and Manny Garcia.

The State was

represented by Sandra L. Sjogren, Assistant Attorney General.
Witnesses were called, sworn and testified, evidence taken and
the matter submitted to the Court subject to further sxibmission
of written closing briefs.
The petitioner's brief was to be submitted by January 30,
1991, the State's opposition brief was to be submitted by March
1, 1991, and petitioner's reply brief was to be submitted by
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March 20, 1991.
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These dates were extended to February 13, 1991

for petitioner, March 15, 1991 for State's response, and April
3, 1991 for petitioner's reply brief.
submitted.

The preparation

All briefs have now been

of this Memorandum

Decision was

based entirely on the hearings held on November 27 and 28,
1990, the submitted briefs, the Court's understanding of the
law as stated

in the briefs, and inferences drawn from the

facts as recited in the briefs and evidence presented before
this

Court.

The

petitioner

has made

many

sound

arguments

supported by the facts and cited case law, and the respondent
has just as ably responded and particularly pointed out the
great weight of the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt, the
impact of which has made rendering a just and fair decision for
all concerned

inordinately

difficult.

The Court now having

considered the evidence, the briefs, and all other pertinent
matters, finds and rules as follows:
Petitioner frames the following issues to be resolved by
this Court.

(A) Use of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony; (D)

Failure to Advise Mr. Gardner Concerning His Right to Testify;
(E) Violation

of

Right

Victim's Character;
Trial

(excluding

to

Presence;

(F)

Consideration

of

(H) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at

subparagraph

(5) Jorgensen

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel on Appeal;

testimony);

(I)

(J) Failure to
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Instruct Jury on Statutory Mitigating Circumstances; and (K)
Failure to Instruct Jury on the Burden as to Existence of
Aggravating Circumstances.
files,

pleadings

and

After careful consideration of the

arguments,

and

over

the

objections, the Court agrees with petitioner.

respondent's

Therefore, the

Court will consider the above issues.

(A) USE OF HYPNOTICALLY ENHANCED TESTIMONY
There is no dispute that hypnotically enhanced testimony is
inadmissible

in

respondent).

One

Utah.

(Briefs

issue presented

filed

by

to this

petitioner
Court

and

is whether

petitioner's conviction must be vacated because it was based on
allegedly inadmissible hypnotically enhanced testimony.
Petitioner
post-hypnotic

makes

a

enhancement

forceful
testimony

argument

on

of Robert

the

alleged

Macri.

Thus,

this Court must first determine what was the nature of such
alleged

post-hypnotic

session

was

petitioner,
present.
informal

not
and#

enhancement

testimony.

The

carefully

documented,

as

thus, the

traditional

safeguards were

It would

pointed

hypnosis
out

by
not

appear the session was more relaxed and

as suggested

by the testimonies

of Macri

and Dr.
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Elliott

Landau,

observation
matters

lending

that

than

Consequently,
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the
to

more

session

was more

prepare

the normal

credence

for

to

to

any

Dr.

Landau's

discuss

legal

safeguards were not

domestic

proceeding.

adhered

to to

preserve the purpose, communication and content of the hypnosis
session.
What was the time frame when the post-hypnotic testimony
was recalled?

The recollection did not occur during or even

immediately after the hypnosis session.
while traveling
California.
elapsed.
surmise

with

a friend

in

It occurred suddenly

a car

during

a trip

to

There was an intervening period of time which had

During that intervening lapse of time, no one can
what

independent

or

interactive

forces

may

have

influenced Macri's thought processes.
It is difficult to determine what Macri's thought processes
were

during

thought

this

about

critical

the

tragic

time

period.

events

Doubtless,

either

he

had

consciously

or

subconsciously on numerous occasions subsequent to the day Mr.
Michael

Burdell was killed.

Other than his own testimony,

there is no evidence presented that the hypnosis was directly
responsible for any change in Maori's testimony.

Based on the
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Court's observation,

the change

in testimony

may have been

induced by merely a natural sequence of events, regardless of
any hypnosis.
The recollection may have come about by subconscious or
even

conscious

process

reviewing

the

various

concluded

his

trial

of

elimination.

scenarios,
testimony

Macri

seemed

After
may

most

mentally

have

finally

logical.

The

resulting confidence in his changed testimony may be because he
personally felt this testimony was the correct version, not
necessarily because of post-hypnotic suggestion.
Witnesses'
reasons.

testimony

may

differ

or

change

for

Witnesses who see an event simultaneously,

many

at the

same place and vantage point, may not testify exactly the same
on one or more or even any critical issues.

They may modify or

alter their testimony because of many reasons, one of which is
being

examined

and

different hearings.

cross-examined

on

the

witness

accurately

at

The various questions at different times

may reinforce or confuse or erode the memory
What

stand

triggers a witness' thought

occurrence which is unrehearsed, unexpected,

of a witness.
process

on any

life-threatening

and transpires in a matter of seconds depends on the totality
of circumstances involving the witness and the factors which

GARDNER V. H0LDEN
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on

those
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circumstances,

actions of others, and so forth.

such

as

fear,

excitement,

Maori's testimony may have

been influenced by such factors.
After hearing the testimonies of Maori and Dr. Landau, this
Court is not convinced the alleged post-hypnotic
should be given the weight petitioner suggests.

enhancement
The purpose

and content of the hypnosis session was vague and inconclusive
at most.

Whatever influence the post-hypnotic enhancement may

have had is shrouded
stage, this

Court

in mystery created by Macri.

is not

convinced,

based

on the

At this
evidence

presented, that hypnosis was the primary or direct cause of the
change in Maori's testimony from the preliminary hearing to the
trial.
Let us, however, consider petitioner's argument that there
was

inadmissible

testimony.

post-hypnotic

enhancement

in

Macri's

There were discrepancies in the testimony of Macri

and Ed Seamons in the timing of the closing of the door and the
number of times petitioner entered the clerk's office.

In the

timing of the closing of the door, both have changed their
testimony.
hearing

Macri changed his testimony from the preliminary

based

on the

alleged

post-hypnotic

enhancement

and

testified he shut the door after the weapon was fired rather
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than petitioner firing the weapon simultaneously when the door
was closed.

During the trial, Seamons' changed his testimony

from the weapon being fired simultaneously

as the door was

closed, before a lunch recess, to the weapon was fired after
the

door

was

closed,

post-hypnotic

after

enhancement

the

lunch

testimony

recess.
was

If

not

Maori's
admitted,

petitioner would be in a position to argue his theory that the
firing of the weapon was unintentional because he was startled
when he saw Macri and Burdell simultaneously when the door was
closing

and

thus

was

surprised

and

the

weapon

went

off

unintentionally.
There is one more step to support the unintentional firing
of the weapon.

Macri has testified

petitioner

entered

the

clerk's office only once and was surprised to see Macri and
Burdell behind the door.

Contrarily,

Seamons has testified

petitioner entered twice and therefore was not surprised to see
Macri and Burdell in the office.
Finally, there is raised the issue of the distance of the
witnesses and the strategic position of each.
has been presented

Based on what

to this Court, Seamons was in a better

position to view what was happening to both petitioner, Macri
and Burdell, in spite of Macri's "fading away" contention.
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Overall, Seamons' testimony is more consistent.

Maori's memory

appears faulty not only in recollecting what happened at the
scene, but also regarding his hypnosis session with Dr. Landau,
his conversations about

the hypnosis with defense counsel Andy

Valdez, and prosecutor Robert Stott.
Taking

into

consideration

the

totality

of

circumstances, the Court agrees with respondent's

events

and

contention

that Mr. Macri's testimony was helpful, but not critical to the
prosecution's case.

The petitioner was in the process of an

escape, and knew or should have known the risks and dangers
inherent in such a venture, particularly
The petitioner

was

armed

with

a

at the courthouse.

single-action

.22

caliber

revolver that needed to be cocked each time it was fired.

In a

short time sequence after shooting Mr. Burdell, he shot bailiff
Nick Kirk; required Richard Thomas, a uniformed prison employee
to show him directions to the stairwell; climbed the stairs to
the second floor where he accosted and threatened Wilbur Miller
to accompany him outside; and proceeded to attempt to escape to
the outside lawn where he was apprehended.

All of this in

spite of being wounded (respondent's brief, pp. 6-9). Thus, it
is the Court's opinion, the jury could infer from the evidence,
that his actions reflect more his desperate nature at each step
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of his attempted escape from the time he was handed the weapon,
that

he

perform

possessed

the

clear

and

unequivocal

intention

to

any act which would accomplish his escape, even to

discharge his weapon when surprised or threatened and to kill
or injure any intruder or person who may be an obstacle to his
escape.
based

Therefore, contrary to the petitioner's

on

the

respondent's

facts

of

this

characterization

case,

this

Court

that

whether

contention,
agrees

with

petitioner

was

startled into firing the gun when the door was closed is not as
relevant as he would attempt to suggest.
There is no dispute post-hypnotically enhanced testimony is
inadmissible.
case.

Such

Such alleged testimony was introduced in this
alleged

testimony

was

inadmissible.

The

Court

rules, however, the admission of such alleged testimony was
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt because of the nature
of Maori's testimony, it was cumulative, it was corroborated
and the weight of the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt,
and, even in the absence of Macri's post-hypnotically enhanced
testimony, there is no likelihood the result would have been
any different for either the guilt or penalty phase beyond a
reasonable doubt.
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TO ADVISE

MR.

GARDNER

CONCERNING

HIS

RIGHT

TO

court

was

not

TESTIFY
The

Court

is

of

the

opinion

the

trial

required to obtain a formal waiver of the defendant's right to
remain silent before he testified.
People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d

504

Petitioner points out in

(Colo. 1984), that defendant

should be free from any influence by his counsel whether he
testifies or not.

This procedure as a matter of course is

manifestly a protection for the defendant, but as pointed out
by the State, is not required.

This Court agrees.

As pointed

out by the State:
Petitioner claimed only that he felt he was
coerced into testifying at guilt phase when he
would rather not have testified. This is not the
same issue. Petitioner did not claim that he
wanted to testify at the penalty hearing but was
prevented form doing so by counsel.
Thus,
petitioner has raised no claim regarding his
right to testify in his own defense.

The Court rules the failure to advise petitioner concerning
his right to testify was not error, and if it was, it was
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the weight
of the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt.
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(E) VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO PRESENCE
Although

petitioner

contends

that

a

violation

of

the

accused's right to presence cannot be harmless in a capital
case, this Court is of the opinion that petitioner's right to
be

present

at

all

critical

substantially observed.

stages

of

the

proceeding

was

Petitioner first argues his right to

presence was violated when he left the courtroom before the
completion of the hearing on the Request for Recusal.

There

apparently was a record of this hearing and petitioner has not
shown how much longer the hearing continued, what transpired
during

the

balance

of

the

hearing

in

his

absence

and

demonstrate in some way that his absence from the balance of
the hearing prejudiced
way.

or could have prejudiced him

in any

Thus, the Court sees no violation of petitioner's right

to presence.
Second, petitioner argues that the Court's failing to view
the evidence and rule on the Motion for Change of Venue in
petitioner's presence violated his right to presence.

Here,

again, the Court is of the opinion that there was no violation
of petitioner's

right

to

presence.

The

Court

agrees with

respondent there was no violation of petitioner's right to be

GARDNER V. HOLDEN
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present where the Court reviews exhibits submitted to it in the
party's absence.

Further, on the Motion for a Change of Venue

held on August 5, 1985, the record indicates petitioner was
present (respondent's brief, p. 21).

Thus, the Court sees no

deprivation of petitioner's right to presence.
Thus, in sum, the Court rules there was no violation of
petitioner's

right

to

presence,

and

if

there

was,

it

was

harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt based on the weight of
the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt.

(F) CONSIDERATION OF VICTIM'S CHARACTER
The Court is of the opinion petitioner is not entitled to
relief based on information disclosed to the jury about the
victim.

The

Court

is

of

the

opinion

the

disclosure

on

Burdell's life was minimal and not of such prejudice to require
a

new

trial.

Although

petitioner

contends

that

Booth

v.

Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers,
490 U.S.

, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876 (1989), "do

not depend on the quantity of evidence about the victim's good
character,11

and further that the risk of the death penalty

being imposed was enhanced because petitioner "was not allowed
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to present testimony in mitigation from Mr. Burdell's friends
and relatives that a life sentence was appropriate"
persuade

this

Court

to

rule

that

references

to

character requires a granting of a new trial.

does not
Burdell's

Although the

quantity of evidence about the victim's good character should
not be a determining factor, the Court is of the opinion that
the extensiveness and stress placed on character

and effect on

family and community was minimal in comparison to the total
evidence

presented,

instructions given

and

(See

was

further

minimized

(J) below). Consequently,

by

the

it is not

necessary to apply Booth and Gathers retroactively.
Thus, the Court rules there was no error on information
disclosed to the jury, and if there was, it was harmless error
beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the weight of the direct
evidence of petitioner's guilt.

(H) INEFFECTIVE

ASSISTANCE

OF

COUNSEL

AT

TRIAL

(EXCLUDING

SUBPARAGRAPH (5), JORGENSEN TESTIMONY)

As pointed out in respondent's brief, there is a strong
presumption of counsel's competency.

Strickland v. Washington,

GARDNER V. HOLDEN
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Petitioner has the burden to demonstrate

counsel's representation failed to meet this objective standard
of reasonableness.
1983).

Codiana v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101-09 (Utah

The two prongs that petitioner must establish under the

Strickland test is that counsel's performance was less than
that

expected

of a reasonably

competent

attorney,

and that

counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the
trial.

Speculation about a different outcome is insufficient

to establish that counsel was inadequate.
P.2d

701

1983).

(Utah

1985);

State v. White.

State v. Buel, 700
671

P.2d

The claim must be a demonstrative reality.

191

(Utah

State v.

Frame. 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).

a.

Guilt Phase
First claim:

The Court is of the opinion counsel's failure

to adequately present the defense that petitioner shot Burdell
unintentionally

as

a

reaction

to

having

been

shot

has

previously been discussed under the Post-Hypnotically Enhanced
Testimony
here.

section

above,

and

that

discussion

Although there may be some deficiency

is

applicable

in failing to

adequately present this defense, there is no prejudice because
of the weight of the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt.
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Further, petitioner disputes respondent's claim of failing
to show prejudice because of petitioner's failure "to present
ballistics or other expert testimony to illustrate the impact
of his wound."

Petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to

make adequate preparation

for such testimony

and respondent

vigorously objected to providing funds for petitioner to secure
expert testimony in his defense.

Related to this is counsel's

failure to describe petitioner's shoulder wound as a wound to
the chest and lung.
merit

Petitioner's arguments have merit.

of petitioner's

direct

evidence

mentioned,

the

of

argument must be weighed
petitioner's

aggressive

and

guilt.

As

unhesitating

against

The
the

previously
conduct

of

petitioner in pursuing his escape convinces this Court that
although

there

may

be

some

deficiency

in

counsel's

representation, it does not establish prejudice because of the
weight of the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt.

Second

claim:

Counsel's

failure

to

object

to

Macri's

hypnotically enhanced testimony has previously been discussed
as mentioned
here.

above

and

that

discussion

is

also

applicable

The Court agrees with respondent that "this failure may

establish some deficiency in counsel's performance, it does not
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establish prejudice to petitioner,"
petitioner's words

In addition, nothing in

or deeds during his escape betrayed

his

desperate and ill-conceived plan to escape, whatever the cost.

Third

claim:

Petitioner

contends

that

counsel's

advice

that petitioner should testify was constitutionally inadequate
representation.

This

Court

disagrees.

As

pointed

out

in

respondent's brief, based on the circumstances of this case,
petitioner's testimony was the only way his version of what
transpired could be given as evidence to the jury and he was
advised and prepared regarding his testimony.
was

counsel's

testify

for

disagreement

strategy.
that
and

In

reason.
no

addition,
The

complaints

petitioner

record
were

It appears this

does

noted.

not

wanted

to

show

any

Although

this

strategy may not have produced the desired result, this Court
cannot find it was ineffective assistance of counsel.
respondent's

brief,

pp.

12,

13

and

14

for

discussion

(See
and

citations).

Fourth

claim:

Petitioner

contends

that

counsel

was

ineffective for introducing petitioner's prior criminal history
on direct examination.

Under State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325

(Utah 1986), petitioner's prior criminal convictions would have

been
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inadmissible

unless

shown

that

the

probative

value

outweighed the prejudicial effect, and under State v, Bruce.
779 P.2d 646

(Utah 1989), the State would be precluded from

using convictions for theft, robbery and burglary, unless there
was

evidence

that

the

crimes

involved

dishonesty

or

false

statement, or were otherwise more probative than prejudicial.
This Court is of the opinion Utah's law existent at the time of
petitioner's trial

permitted

felony history

to be used

for

impeachment purposes, and crimes such as theft, robbery and
burglary were defined as crimes of dishonesty.
pointed

Further, as

out in respondent's brief, the jury was aware that

petitioner

had

a previous

criminal

history

because

of

his

escape attempt at the time he was shot and the two robbery
convictions

admitted

to

establish

aggravating

circumstance.

The State argues that the introduction of the additional crimes
was harmless in the face of the weight of evidence regarding
his guilt.

Additionally, there was no showing of any prejudice

to petitioner.
The

This Court agrees.

petitioner

points

out

that

the

respondent

did

not

comment on "Petitioner's approval was required before counsel
could

stipulate

aggravating

to prior

circumstances

convictions used
in

Utah

Code

to establish the
Ann.,

Section

GARDNER V. HOLDEN
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Although the State argues that it was not

unreasonable or prejudicial for counsel's failure to request a
bifurcated

hearing

because

prior

convictions

would

be

introduced in the trial on the merits, petitioner contends that
reasonably effective counsel in a capital case should raise
questions about improper procedures and occurrences even though
not ruled upon by an appellate court.

The same is true as to

being aware of the advisory committee note indicating the Utah
law would be changed if Rule 609 of the Rules of Evidence were
adopted.

Further, counsel's Motion to Suppress only dealt with

"precluding the prosecution
these crimes.

from going

into the details of

When the Court stated that prosecutors could

only elicit the fact of conviction and its date and location,
James Valdez stated, 'That's correct.'"
Petitioner contends there is a difference as to knowledge
of being in custody for an unspecified offense at the time of
the escape attempt and a recitation of his entire criminal
history.
Petitioner's above arguments are very strong.
has not adequately covered these arguments.

At any rate, those

arguments must be balanced with the evidence
trial,

and

submitted

to

this

Court

for

The State

this

introduced

at

hearing.

As
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pointed out in respondent's brief, not every possible objection
that is possible need be made by trial counsel.
made during this trial.

It was not

Therefore, it is incumbent upon this

Court to determine whether such failure in this instance was
error,

and

reasonable

whether
doubt.

that

error

was

prejudicial

a

Again, based on the strength of the direct

evidence regarding petitioner's guilt, the Court
assistance

beyond

of counsel may

represent

finds that

some deficiency

in the

above facts, but rules that the deficiency was not prejudicial
beyond a reasonable

Fifth

Claim:

doubt.

Petitioner

contends

he was

prejudiced

by

counsel's failure to request a bifurcated guilt phase to avoid
introduction of his previous convictions that were used as an
aggravating circumstance of first degree murder.
The discussion on the Fourth Claim is applicable here, as
well

as

the

ruling.

This

Court

agrees

with

respondent's

position that there was no requirement to bifurcate the guilt
phase from the penalty phase where previous convictions were
introduced to establish an element of the charged offense and
this Court agrees prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt has not
been established because of the strength of the direct evidence
of petitioner's guilt.
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Sixth Claim:

Petitioner contends he was prejudiced because

counsel did not verify the validity of his guilty pleas to
these crimes.

There is provided no reason or evidence, or even

claim these guilty pleas were not valid.

Ineffectiveness of

counsel has not been demonstrated for this claim.

Seventh Claim:
record.
and

Counsel did not place every transaction on

No record was made of disagreements between petitioner

counsel

petitioner's
petitioner

about

how

request
required

the

that
to

case

was

counsel

object

at

to

be

handled

and

Further,

was

preserving

his

withdraw.
trial

ineffective assistance of counsel claim?

to

State v. Medina, 738

P.2d 1021 (Utah 1921).
As criminal cases go, a capital case is unique because the
life of a human being is placed in jeopardy.
defendant

charged

with

a

capital

offense

feelings between the defendant and counsel.

Representing a
creates

intense

There may arise

disputes over some or every aspect of the trial.

Based on the

evidence presented to this Court, there were disputes between
petitioner

and

counsel

during

representation of petitioner.
and

counseled

did

not

the

course

of

counsel's

It is evident that petitioner

enjoy

a

completely

harmonious

GARDNER V. HOLDEN
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The

constant

friction

that

arose

between

petitioner and counsel appeared to be "hot and cold" all during
the course of the trial, as well as post-trial, as evidenced by
this Writ.

Because of the nature of this relationship

, it

would be difficult for counsel to place on the record all of
the various disagreements between petitioner and counsel.

When

counsel is attempting to provide the best assistance of counsel
he

is

capable

of

providing

but

must,

in

the

process,

continually skirmish with his own client, the Court perceives
the quandary that results.
in

this

instance,

the

This is a tough

Court

is

not

issue to decide,

inclined

to

disturb

counsel's trial strategy or procedure because the Court can see
no prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt because of the great
weight of the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt.
The

issue

of

preserving

the

ineffective

assistance

of

counsel claim is moot, since this Court is considering such
claim.

Further,

there

is

a

record

based

orv -the

trial

transcripts, as well as the record of this Court's proceedings.

Eighth

Claim:

Andy

Valdez

and

Jim

Valdez

could

not

represent petitioner because they were witnesses and otherwise
had conflicts of interest.

They were witnesses at the scene in

GARDNER V. HOLDEN

front of the courthouse lawn*
talked

to

him

about

January

Professional

1,

Conduct

Both approached petitioner and

each

petitioner's apprehension.
(effective

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE 22

other's

1988),

and

prohibit

witnesses

(Opening

Valdezes

also

knew

Kirk

Nick

the

Brief,

and

other

Valdez

and

Valdez

to

contention."
the

issue,

that

petitioner,

Petitioner

pp.

Code

of

because

the

12-14).

The

witnesses

(Opening

Although Andy Valdez thought there was a record

of a waiver, no record has been found.
conflict

witnessed

previous

representation

were

any

and

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct

Valdezes

Brief, p.15).

safety

there

and

withdraw

twice

contends

"The

the

was

There is no record of
animosity

fact

petitioner

(Opening
State

between

Brief,
simply

asked
pp.

Andy
Andy

16-17).

ignores

this

Based on the briefs submitted, this Court is of

opinion

representing

that

the

petitioner

petitioner

waived

petitioner

agreed

any
to

problems
was
issue

allow

regarding

discussed
of

with

conflict

the Valdezes

of
to

the

Valdezes

petitioner

and

interest

and

continue

their

representation of petitioner.
There

is

still

the

issue whether

independent

counsel's

advice should have been provided to petitioner to advise him of
the

implications

of the conflict

of

interest

problem.

The
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Court rules though there may be some evidence of a conflict and
as a result, some deficiency in representation, because of the
weight of the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt, there is
no prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt.

b.

Penalty phase
First

claim:

There

evidence in mitigation.

was

insufficient

presentation

of

That "Effective representation of the

accused in a capital case demands that counsel challenge the
State's

aggravating

evidence

and

present

understandable theory of mitigation."
was not done.
relating

to

a

cohesive

and

Petitioner contends this

Primarily, there was inadequate investigation
petitioner's

mental

health

prior

to

trial.

Whatever evidence was presented was inadequate —

too little

and

Dr.

too

late.

Heinbecker's
sufficient

There

testimony.
medical

or

is
Was

dispute
there

psychological

regarding
sufficient
evaluations

Peter

time

and

for

Dr.

Heinbecker to adequately and completely testify in behalf of
petitioner?

The Court is of the opinion there was not.

Dr.

Heinbecker was contacted a mere 24 hours before he testified.
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During that time he "was able only to examine some of the
records, interview Mr. Gardner for about one hour, and talk to
his mother and brother for a total of 2.5 hours."

Further,

"Dr. Heinbecker testified that, in a case of this significance,
he would have expected more time to prepare his evaluation."
(Opening Brief, p. 26).
Dr. Mark Rindflesh, a psychiatrist, evaluated petitioner in
May

1985.

He

apparently

was

not

petitioner (Opening Brief, p. 28) .
to

evaluate

declined.

or

No

testify

further

in

behalf

asked

to

testify

for

Dr. Agnes Plenk was asked
of

petitioner,

but

she

effort was made to seek professional

assistance for petitioner, nor seek State assistance in doing
so.

In addition, present counsel's efforts to secure expert

testimony for petitioner's evaluation was opposed by the State
and sustained by this Court.

As a result, no satisfactory

mental health evaluation of petitioner has ever been available
to petitioner to present at any hearing.
Petitioner contends the deprivation of adequate evaluations
has

prevented

petitioner

from

possible organic brain damage
which

further

prevented

presenting

any

evidence

of

or other mitigating information

presentation

understandable theory of mitigation."

of

"a

cohesive

The Court agrees.

and
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There was insufficient effort to attack the

aggravating

circumstances

imposing the death penalty."

"as

a

justification

for

Petitioner lists the following

deficiencies:
(1)

There was no challenge to Section 76-5-202(1)(c), Utah

Code Ann.
to

a

"The actor knowingly created a great risk of death

person

prosecution
death.

other

alleged

Counsel

did

than
at

the

trial

not

victim
Macri

challenge

and
faced

the

the
a

actor."
great

application

The

risk
of

of

this

aggravating circumstance, although there was authority that it
did

not

apply,

merely

because

Macri

was

standing

next

to

Burdell and had the gun pointed at him briefly.

The Court is

of the opinion this argument is without merit.

Not only was

Macri standing next to Burdell who was shot in extremely close
proximity, but petitioner shortly thereafter shot Kirk.

There

was no way for Macri or anyone else to know that the weapon in
petitioner's hand had to be cocked after each discharge, nor
that he would not shoot anyone else in close proximity.

It

would appear to be naive to suggest that petitioner did not
knowingly create a great risk of death to anyone present in
close proximity such as Macri.
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(2)
penalty

Counsel
phase
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did

not

make

an

"which could have
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opening

statement

countered

the

at

effect

the

of the

negative evidence introduced in the State's case in the penalty
phase. M
In retrospect and having the benefit of the entire record,
waiving
during

the
the

opening
heat

of

statement
the

may

appear

trial, many

to

be

critical

error.

But

decisions

must

quickly be made based on the evidence and counsel's strategy.
As

mentioned

materialized,

previously,
but

should

the
not

desired
be

held

result

may

not

have

against

counsel.

The

making of an opening statement at the penalty phase falls in
this category and this Court is not prepared to disturb

such

decision.

(3)

Counsel

did

not

adequately

voir

dire

the

jury.

Because this was a capital case, individual voir dire should
have

been

requested,

because

of

the

publicity,

and

questions should have been asked to determine juror bias.
same reasoning as

more
The

(2) above is applicable here, and the Court

is not prepared to disturb such decision.
The Court
established

agrees with respondent

prejudice beyond

that petitioner has not

a reasonable

doubt

on the above
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paragraphs (1), (2) , and (3) , and they are, therefore, denied
on their merits.

(I) INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ON APPEAL
Based on Mr. Ed Brass's testimony and the submitted briefs,
this Court is of the opinion there was no conflict of interest
by Mr. Brass having previously represented Carma Hainsworth and
having

subsequently

considered

the

represented

matter

of

petitioner.

identification

of

The
the

Court

has

person

who

handed petitioner the gun, and the effect on the jury which
directly

involves

Mr.

Brass'

client,

Carma

Hainsworth.

Although not brought to the Supreme Court's attention, nor a
record made of this, nor waiver received from petitioner, the
Court is of the opinion Mr. Brass had analyzed the situation
and determined there was no conflict and the Court agrees with
his analyses.
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention there exists
a conflict of interest on direct appeal from the trial court,
as well as ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal from the
trial

court

to

the

Supreme

Court.

Neither

Mr.

Brass, or
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appellate counsel Ms. Watt, were at fault, but a victim of
circumstances.
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that unusual
circumstances existed to excuse the failure of petitioner to
raise issues on appeal.
Mr. Ed Brass was appointed to replace the Salt
Lake
Legal
Defenders
Association
based
on
petitioner's
claim
he
received
ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial and on direct
appeal.
Mr. Brass filed a supplemental brief
arguing there was no evidentiary record to frame
the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.
In addition, it is not contested that Mr. Brass
was appointed by the Supreme Court's order, a
copy of which order he claims not to have
received, to file a supplemental brief to address
matters not previously addressed. Consequently,
based on a telephone conversation with Chief
Justice Hall, he understood he was appointed only
to address the issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial. Mr. Brass claims to not have
received a copy of its opinion.
A further problem exists.
The Supreme Court's order discharging the Salt
Lake County Legal Defenders Association was not
scrupulously
honored.
Attorney
Joan
Watt
testified she was instructed in an informal
telephone call from the Supreme Court's clerk to
file the appropriate documents in Mr. Gardner's
behalf
after
the
decision
affirming
his
conviction and sentence was announced. Although
the Supreme Court had decided that he was
entitled
to
independent
counsel
on
the
ineffective assistance issue, Ms. Watt also
prepared the Supplemental Petition for Rehearing
and Supplemental Reply to State's Response to
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, which were
signed and filed by Mr. Brass.

GARDNER V. HOLDEN

Based

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE 29

on Mr. Brass' understanding,

he was appointed

to

represent petitioner on the issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel

at

trial

and,

prepared

by the Salt

further,

Lake Legal

appellate

pleadings

were

Defenders Association, but

signed by Mr. Brass, even though the Salt Lake Legal Defenders
Association

had

previously

been

discharged

in

representing

petitioner.

This Court is of the opinion petitioner received

ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because all
appealable issues were not addressed and there is a question of
whether issues appealed were properly addressed by independent
counsel because pleadings were prepared by the Salt Lake Legal
Defenders Association which had previously been discharged on
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.
The Court grants petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus on the
issue

of

ineffective

assistance

of

counsel

on

appeal.

Petitioner should have the opportunity to appeal all issues to
the Utah State Supreme Court by independent
issues based
appealable

on

independent

issues

and

based

counsel's
on

own

counsel

on all

investigation

independent

counsel's

of
own

research and preparation of appellate documents.
Petitioner's other issues which he claims he was unable to
address

on

appeal

have

already

been

dealt

with

in

decision, and therefore need not be addressed any further.

this
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(J) FAILURE

TO
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INSTRUCT

JURY

ON

STATUTORY

MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCES
The petitioner's claim the jury was not instructed on all
appropriate statutory mitigating factors is not supported by
the evidence in this case.
The Court is in agreement with the State that:
The definition of "duress" does not support Mr.
Gardner's argument that the trial court should
have included as a mitigating circumstance the
factor outlined in Utah Code Ann., Section
76-3-207(2)(c).
Although force or stress could come from a physical source
and

the

Eighth

Amendment

may

require

that

mitigating

circumstances be broadly interpreted in favor of the defendant
and, further, the weight of a specific instruction that Mr.
Gardner acted under extreme duress carries more weight with the
jury than the instruction

the jury could still consider other

factors, the Court is of the opinion the jury was sufficiently
advised they could consider petitioner's condition, as pointed
out by the State:
That the jury was instructed that it could
consider any other facts in aggravation or
mitigation along with the specifically listed
factors (R. 613). The jury was also told it
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could consider as mitigating circumstances which
did not justify or excuse the crime but which
they might consider as extenuating or reducing
moral culpability (R. 614). Thus, the jury was
free to consider whether the fact that petitioner
had been wounded mitigated against the death
penalty.
The Court rules there was no failure to instruct the jury
on statutory mitigating circumstances, and if there was, it was
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt based on the weight of
the direct evidence of petitioner's guilt.

(K) FAILURE TO

INSTRUCT JURY ON THE BURDEN

OF PROOF AS TO

EXISTENCE OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT

As

pointed

"previously

out

in

State's

unarticulated

sentence in Utah.

brief,

basis11

for

this

issue

challenging

a

is

a

death

This Court is of the opinion that the trial

court properly rejected the requested instruction applying the
reasonable

doubt

circumstances.

standard
The

jury

to

the

need

existence

only

find

of
that

aggravating
the

total

aggravation outweighs the total mitigation beyond a reasonable
doubt,

and

that

death

is

the

appropriate

penalty

in

the
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circumstances of the case beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v.

Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah), (cert, denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982)).

In summary, petitioner has contended that each error or
omission collectively and independently deprived petitioner of
his due process.
by this Court

Because many of the contentions were resolved

on the basis of harmless

error and thus no

prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt because of the great weight
of the direct evidence, petitioner no doubt queries how many
harmless errors need there be to constitute deprivation of due
process.

The Court has considered this dilemma.

The Court has

weighed each independently, and collectively, and still finds
that the weight of the direct evidence is so great that the
collective

effect

is

still

insufficient

to

overcome

the

overwhelming direct evidence of petitioner's guilt.
Particularly in respect to the ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, the Court has found no prejudice to petitioner
beyond a reasonable doubt because of the overwhelming direct
evidence of guilt.

As pointed out in respondent's brief, there

is no necessity to inquire into any deficiency if there is no
prejudice.

Failure

to

establish

defeats an ineffectiveness claim.

either

prong

of

the

test

State v. Geary. 707 P.2d

645,

646

(Utah
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1985).

It must

not be

speculative, but a

demonstrated reality; the Court is of the opinion such was not
the case here.

In conclusion, this Court rules that petitioner's Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or for Post-Conviction Relief
should be denied except for the penalty phase and the appeal
phase.

In respect to the penalty phase and the appeal phase,

the Court has found there was ineffective assistance of counsel
which prejudiced petitioner's case; therefore, the Court grants
petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or for Post-Conviction
Relief in respect to the penalty phase and appeal phase.

Dated this ^-^

dav of July, 1991.

RAYMOND S. UNO '
JUDGE PRO TEM
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